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Abstract: This paper shows that in-kind-transfers are an effective instrument
to stabilize agreements when compliance cannot be guaranteed. It
demonstrates the weak superiority of in-kind-transfers for a
unilateral relationship between two agents. In particular, it proves
that, under conditions of perfect knowledge and necessary self-
enforcement of contracts, both agents are at least not worse off by
in-kind-transfers compared to monetary payments when no self-
enforcing contract exists which,is based on monetary payments.
This result holds for finitely and for infinitely repeated games.
The authors are solely responsible for the contents and distribution of each Kiel
Working Paper. Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary form,
interested readers are requested to direct criticism and suggestions directly to
the authors and to clear any quotations with them.1. Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory has proved that finitely repeated games often result in
inefficient outcomes under conditions of certainty and full rationality (Selten (1978)).
The outcome of such games which can be developed by recursive induction exhibits the
same properties which are observable for a one-shot-game. If commitments are not
enforceable, the dominant strategies lead to a non-exploitation of possible gains as the
prisoners' dilemma most dramatically illustrates. To my knowledge, the economic
literature presents exclusively exemplifying numbers and corresponding utility
functions to display the utilities which accrue to the agents. These numbers reflect the
total utility which the involved agents assign to a specific outcome. It is therefore
natural to focus on monetary payments which increase or decrease the real numbers if
certain compensations are to be paid in a game of mutual exchange.
However, the assumption of transfers which are only variable with respect to their
amount prevents further insights into stabilization policies. E.g., assume - as we will do
in the remainder - a unilateral relationship in which the (consumption) activities of an
agent B can concern an agent A harmfully but not vice versa. If the total gains of a
restructuring of B's activities are positive, A could principally pay B for changing his
plans. But if any commitment is not enforceable, B's dominant strategy is to take the
money and breach the contract which induces A to refrain from any compensation.
But if A is alternatively able to deliver certain commodities to B which are known to
decrease the harmful effect and can only be resold at a price which is lower than the
market price, the lack of any self-enforcing transfer is not obvious. It is the purpose of
this paper to discuss the potential stabilizing role of such in-kind-transfers which has -
to my knowledge - been by and large unnoticed by the literature.
1 On the contrary,
economic advisers often complain about in-kind-transfers and accuse them to represent
an inefficient compensation instrument. Section 2 will outline the basic assumptions for
a unilateral externality relationship between two agents. Section 3 will prove five
propositions and a Theorem which demonstrates the relevance of in-kind-transfers for
1 Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) discuss the role of in-kind-transfers for discriminating between
real and pretended claims of receivers and Bruce and Waldman (1991) demonstrate that in-kind-
transfers are an efficient respond to an inefficient behaviour of recipients who attempt to
manipulate the magnitude of transfers (see also the literature quoted there). Most of the economic
literature dealing with transfers addresses transfer paradoxes, i.e. transfers which increase theself-enforcement issues. Section 4 will deal with the impact of in-kind-transfers on
infinitely repeated games and Section 5.will discuss several applications. Section 6 will
address the limitations and possible extensions and will draw conclusions for a
reassessment of in-kind-transfers.
2. The Nature of In-Kind-Transfers
Assume that time-invariant utility functions (1) and a by-product function (2) represent
a unilateral relationship between an agent A and an agent B:





for all C= A,B and all i=l,...,n
for all C= A,B and all i*j G {l,...,n}
du




(2) b = b (X^, .... XnB)
Agent C consumes the total amount of the commodity i which is denoted by Xj
C and
directly enters his utility function. Two sets K and L distinguish the properties of the
by-product function (2):












utility of donors and decrease the utility of receivers (see Rao (1992) and the quoted literature
there). In this paper, the assumption of constant prices will rule out any transfer paradoxes.The utilities of both agents and the by-product are a function of the total sum of
commodities. The utility functions exhibit the usual properties
2 and rule out any scope
effects which are surpressed for the by-product function, too.
3 A non-empty set L
assumes at least one commodity to exist for B which lowers the by-product by an
increase in consumption. Otherwise, mutual improvements conflict with an increase of
total benefits because every restructuring of B's activities which induces a lower by-
product would make B worse off. Because non-enforcement is at the heart of this paper,
it rules any coercive measures out.
This paper assumes that agent A is a Stackelberg leader and agent B a follower. Hence,
A anticipates the reaction of B but B does not anticipate the compensation policy of A.
This assumption conceives A as an agent who is fully aware of by-products which
originate from B's activities and B as an agent who is totally ignorant with respect to the
influence of his consumption plans on A.
4 Both agents are facing constraints which are
composed of their constant individual incomes, the compensations paid and received,
respectively, and the expenses for commodities. In a cooperative setting which ensures








with A. as the shadow price of the total budget constraint and q^ as the price of
commodity i.
This outcome could be guaranteed by a (C*,b*)-contract which specifies the optimal
level of by-products b* according to (3) and the compensations C* which must at least
make B not worse off. To ensure that this paper discusses a real problem, b* must fall
short from the outcome of the isolated utility maximization of B.
If any enforcement possibilities are absent, any compensation will only increase B's
budget at first glance. But even in such a case, mutual improvements are possible if B's
marginal utility for harmful commodities "immediately" approaches zero whereas it is
The utility functions assume also that the inequality for the first derivative induces an inequality
for the second one. The same applies to the Xk
B E K with respect to the by-product function.
The appendix addresses scope effects and deals with the general second-order-conditions.
Basically, this assumption originates from better tractability. Except concerning Proposition 4, the
reader will be able to verify that the salient results do not change if B is able to anticipate the
policy of A.still sufficiently positive for commodities belonging to L. Then, it can even pay for A to
support a non-compliant B when the disutility of compensations is at least outweighted
by the utility which originates from the increased consumption of commodities
belonging to L. Generally, a non-compliant B will adjust his consumption in the case of




with X* as the changed (at least lower) shadow price which represents B's marginal
utility of income.
Alternatively, A is able to deliver certain goods to B and to bear the corresponding costs
Cj = 2 qj Zj. Zj represents the specific amount of in-kind-transfers. Contrary to financial
compensations, any retrading of received commodities incurs certain costs which
originate from change costs, irreversibilities, discounts for used commodities, etc. I
assume that these costs, Cj, are constant (i.e. independent of the retrading degree) and to.









B + Zj - Yi
Zj-yj>0
Y
B + 2 (q- - c) y- - 2 q- x- = 0
i i
If a certain amount of in-kind-transfers, Zj, endows B, B has to decide on how many of
these commodities he wants to retrade, i.e. y;. The retraded commodities yield a price of
q; - Cj per unit. The commodities spent by B, i.e. X;
B, sum up to the self-bought ones,
i.e. Xj
B, plus the remaining in-kind-transfers. According to the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem
with L as the Lagrangian function, (6) indicates the optimality conditions:(6) Vi EK UL:
aL du
B dL
= - X'O: < 0, Xj
B > 0, Xj
B =0








Pi = 0, Zj - yf > 0
Pi is the shadow price of the condition that agent B cannot retrade more in-kind-
transfers than he has received from A. pj = 0 is a direct consequence of the utility
function's curvature. If an agent preferred a redevotion of in-kind-transfers above the
actual non-negative level, he must have allocated his commodities inefficiently before
compensations were given. The non-negative marginal utility with respect to all
commodities ensures that there is never a positive shadow price of the endowment
constraint.
The assumption of positive levels Xj





(7) = X' q; and — = X' (qj - Cj)
cannot hold for i = j. That means that either xj
B is positive and y; zero or Xj
B is zero and
y; is positive or both are zero. Without lack of generality, we will omit the last case
because it does not add any new information to the economics of in-kind-transfers.
(7) indicates that in-kind-transfers drive a wedge between the marginal utilities of the
total amount of commodities which receive in-kind-transfers and those which do not.
The propositions of Chapter 3 will reveal that this wedge is apt to improve the
performance of self-enforcing agreements because in-kind-transfers can enforce a
certain consumption pattern which monetary transfers are likely to fail.3. Pareto Improvements by In-Kind-Transfers
Any positive compensation improves B's situation. (8) displays A's marginal utility with







(8) — = Z + — Z _
dC i dXj
A~ dC db j dXj
B dC
which can be negative for any given C or reach a maximum for some positive C's. Note
that - for a positive C - dXj
A/dC, i.e. the change in A's consumption which originates
from given transfers, is non-positive and negative for at least one commodity because A





(9) — < 0 , C > 0, C =0
dC dC
As mentioned above, even monetary compensations can improve A's welfare.
s But in-
kind-transfers can improve on an outcome that attributes zero monetary compensations
to the optimal policy of A.
Proposition 1: An empty set of monetary transfers which improve A's welfare
does not necessarily imply a corresponding empty set of in-kind-
transfers.
Proof: An empty set of monetary payments directly translates into du
A/dC (CM=0) < 0.
Without lack of generality, suppose that L = {Xj}, i.e. the improving compensation is
concentrated on only one commodity. Total differentiation of B's optimal
compensation-dependent utility gives






Hence, the employed functions always guarantee the second-order-conditions to be fulfilled for an
























Keep in mind that this formula displays a change in the optimal non-compliance utility.
This change originates from a change of the degree of compensations. At point C = 0,
all terms in the numerator are identical for monetary and in-kind-transfers. Furthermore,
at C = 0 the shadow price of the budget constraint is A.
1 (see (6)). The denominator,
however, differs dependent on the mode of compensations. According to (4) and (7)
with M and I denoting monetary and in-kind-transfers, it turns out for positive costs Cj
that
(10) [duB/dX,B]M= X' q, > [duB/dX^j = X' (qi - c,)
which is equivalent to
(11) [dXjB/dCJ! > [dXjB/dCJM and
du
A/dC (Cr0) > du
A/dC (CM=0), q.e.d.
Hence, there may exist situations in which in-kind-transfers are able to improve A's
welfare whereas monetary ones do not. Proposition 2 restricts the respective
instrumental set of agent A.
Proposition 2: If only in-kind-transfers can maximize the welfare of agent A,
the set of efficient in-kind-transfers is a subset ofL.
Proof: The condition Y
A - 2 qj z; - 2 qj X;
A = 0 constrains A's utility maximization
which yields the optimality conditions for all z as(12) V i,j E K U L: X




The optimal partial derivatives of the total consumption of X;
B with respect to the in-
kind-transfer are a result of the utility maximization of B according to (7). Additionally,
du


















for all j * i, i.e. for
all other commodities
and
0 < CO;: < q,7
Hence, the optimality condition is given by








for all j ^ i,
CO;; < X
A qj
If i E K, A can easily be better off by changing to monetary transfers because the
beneficial effects are lower in the case of in-kind-transfers. The factor for harmful
consumption is unity whereas the factors for beneficial consumption, COJJ, are lower
than qjAjj which would be valid for monetary transfers. Hence, because the superiority -
of monetary compensations was ruled out, the set of employed z; is a subset of L. Q.e.d.A salient conclusion is given in
Proposition 3: For any degree C of compensations, agent A is at least not
better off by substituting in-kind-transfers I E L developed
according to (13) by monetary transfers.
Proof: Note that (10) and (11) are also fulfilled for a given arbitrary C (change X,' by
X.*). Proposition 2 restricts the set of efficient options to a subset of L as it was
demonstrated for in Proposition 1. Q.e.d.
But the corresponding proposition does not automatically apply to agent B. Defining •&
= {yi | yi e L, uB(y1)Cl) > uB(CM*)} leads to
Proposition 4: If the optimal in-kind-transfer policy of A belongs to •&, agent B
is not better off by substituting in-kind-transfers by monetary
transfers.
Proof: Omitted
The set •fr defines the set of in-kind-transfers which does not worsen the outcome for B
compared to the optimal monetary transfer policy. Proposition 4 stipulates that agent B's
disutility which originates from enforcing a specific consumption pattern must fall short
of the utility of a greater endowment of in-kind-transfers compared to monetary
transfers. Agent A as a Stackelberg leader does not automatically meet this condition
because he evaluates his in-kind-transfer policy according to changes in the by-product.
The following lemma helps to explain the essential meaning of Proposition 3:
Lemma: If 1.(qi - Cj)y[ > C^* holds for the optimal in-kind-transfer
policy, both agents are not worse off by the introduction of in-
kind-transfers.
In such a case, in-kind-transfers ensure at least this consumption of commodities which
monetary transfers enable to consume. The lemma always applies if the optimal
monetary transfers are zero. But it does not describe a complete condition because B's
utility function defines implicitly a frontier of in-kind-transfers which just outweigh
consumption pattern and endowment effects. This frontier belongs to fr but does not
meet the lemma's condition.
Propositions 1-3 reveal that in a world of perfect information and non-enforcement,
agent A cannot be worse off by the introduction of in-kind-transfers. Because this10
conclusion incorporates the optimal CM as well as the optimal Cj, to exploit the
advantages of in-kind-transfers is always a weakly dominant strategy for agent A.
Together with Proposition 4, Propositions 1-3 have proven the following Theorem:
Theorem of Weak Pareto Superiority of In-Kind-Transfers:
Under conditions of perfect knowledge, if any agreement is not enforceable (i.e. must be
self-enforcing), if the utilities and the by-product are given by (1) and (2), if retrading
incurs positive costs and if the optimal in-kind-transfer policy belongs to ft, both agents
are at least not worse off by in-kind-transfers compared to monetary transfers.
In such a case, A is able to enforce a certain consumption pattern of B which monetary
transfers fail to meet. The Theorem always holds if A denies any positive monetary
transfers because they do not improve his situation. However, if the optimal policy does
not belong to •&, the Stackelberg leader A is able to improve his situation at the expense
of B's utility.
Assuming positive amounts of two in-kind-transfer-commodities 1 and m and deviding
the respective optimality conditions yields
db 3b db
db db db
The first terms in either numerator and denominator represent the unity-weighted direct
effect and the second and the third terms represent the effects of changes in beneficial
and harmful consumption, respectively. The formula reveals that - ceteris paribus - the
lower the coefficients coj are for an in-kind-transfer the higher is their relative share, qj
= Ci and qm = cm gives
f q,
(14)11
However, this "best non-compliance world" for self-enforcing agreements cannot
substitute enforcement.
Proposition 5: Generally, every self-enforcing agreement sustained by in-kind-
transfers does not coincide with the cooperative outcome of full
compliance (even if qt = ct for all I in-kind-transfer-
commodities).
Proof: Suppose that for all m in-kind-transfers with Xm
B EMCL,qm = cm. Agent B




= X' q{ for all i*m and = 0 for all Xm
B 6M
Because in-kind-transfers are not retradable, the shadow price X remains at the X'-





which differs from the best non-compliance world result above. Q.e.d.
The necessary limitation on beneficial in-kind-transfers precludes that the best in-kind-
transfer-scheme can obtain the result of the compliance world. A social optimum would
demand not only an increase in the consumption of beneficial commodities but also a
decrease in the consumption of harmful ones. In-kind-transfers cannot accomplish this
outcome unless the by-product-function assumes sufficient scope effects. These effects
could principally allow the reduction of harmful consumption Xj
B by an in-kind-
transfer Zj if du
B2/3Xi
BdXi
B is negative but an outcome identical to the cooperative
one is also not ensured and unlikely. Additionally, the effects are ambiguous if at least
one harmful Xj
B exists for which a zm, Xm




Hence, only non-positive scope effects with respect to the in-kind-transfers can
unambiguously diminish the gap between the outcome based on in-kind-transfers and
the cooperative outcome.
This section has shown that in-kind-transfers are able to realize gains which monetary
payments leave unexploited. Because this non-cooperative outcome will be anticipated
for the final period of a finitely repeated game, it also turns out in all previous periods12
including the first one when discounting effects can be ruled out. Discounting effects
accrue to a difference in the interest rates for saving and borrowing and the individual
time preference. E.g., if agent B exhibits a low time preference compared to the saving
interest rate, he will smooth his intertemporal consumption plan by saving in early
periods and dissaving in later ones in order to maximize his lifetime utility. A who
knows that redevoted in-kind-transfers of early periods will be saved and spent later
will anticipate this behaviour. Dependent on his individual time preference, A will
evaluate the optimal plan of in-kind-transfers. Thus, discounting effects change the
game essentially from a repeated into a general dynamic finite one.
4. The Role of In-Kind-Transfers in Infinitely Repeated Games
Individual time preferences and interest rates decide on the question of a cooperative
outcome in an infinitely repeated game. The infinite repetition can render such
strategies of an agent credible which punishes another agent for any deviance from the
agreement. The economic literature, especially game-theoretic applications, discuss
intensively the conditions of self-enforcement and stabilization issues in infinite games.
Many papers deal with the corresponding problem of incomplete contracts. E.g.,
Shavell (1984) explores the role of remedies for breach and of opportunities to
renegotiate for contract designs. Hart and Moore (1988) describe a game of incomplete
contracts which clearly produce under-investment. Thomas and Worrall (1988)
investigate the conditions of self-enforcing of wage contracts. In another paper, Thomas
and Worrall (1990) show that, when expropriation of foreign direct investments cannot
be ruled out, any self-enforcing contract between a host country and an investor will
show up under-optimal investments at least in the first periods. Bulow and Rogoff
(1989), Atkeson (1991), Mohr (1991) and others deal with the impact of sovereignty
constraints on the design of international debt contracts.
However, the adopted approaches restrict themselves on the instruments at hand and
investigate the role of self-enforcement-conditions on the optimal behaviour of the
donor. Again, the instrument set is much larger in most cases because in-kind-transfers
which are known to ameliorate the conditions of compliance can substitute monetary
transfers. The ease of argumentation allows dropping the assumption of A's Stackelberg
leadership which is hardly defensible when addressing infinite repetitions. Applied on
the structure which was outligned in the previous sections, self-enforcement of an















B' denote the discounted sum of the relevant utilities of
compliance and non-compliance and at
B, 0 < at
B < 1, which is strictly non-increasing
in t denotes the discount factors. The condition that realizing the deterrence case must
not make the threating party itself worse off shrinks the credibility of threats. T (which














T+T. A self-enforcing contract must meet condition (15) for all x.
If the compliance constraint were not binding even in the case of a full exploitation of
bargaining gains by agent B, one could adopt the strategic bargaining approach of
Rubinstein (1982) and distribute the maximum bargaining gains dependent on the
discount factors at
A and o^
8 alone when first-mover advantages are negligible. If the
compliance constraint binds, the bargaining gains are diminished because B cannot
guarantee to stick to the agreement. Hence, the agreed-upon b will increase and C will
decrease.
6
Proposition 6: If the compliance constraint (15) is violated for the socially
optimal (b*,C*)-contract and C^j is the degree of monetary
compensations which just fulfills (15), there exists a Cj >_ CM
which also just fulfills (15).
Proof (non-technical): According to (7), in-kind-transfers drive a wedge between the
price-weighted marginal utilities for the total utility maximum of B. This wedge is
responsible for IL^CJ) < u^Cj^) for Cj = CM because only monetary payments allow
the exact balancing of price-weighted marginal utilities. Furthermore, the retrading
potential is lower than in the case of monetary payments. This lower endowment
translates directly into lower future utilities during the time span [x+l,x+T] which
embraces the periods of punishment. Hence, the discounted sum of utilities is not higher
in the case of in-kind-transfers for any Cj = CM. Because the temporary utilities and the
The compliance constraint is the more likely to be binding the more bargaining power B ex ante
has, i.e. with respect to discounting, the more patient B is. Thus, the distribution of gains in the
case of compliance directly affects the seize of gains in the case of non-compliance.14
sum of discounted utilities are an increasing function of transfers, the Cj which just
fulfills (15) is an e-margin, e > 0, greater than the corresponding CM. Q.e.d. ;
If a corresponding in-kind-transfer policy does belong to "&•, in-kind-transfers prove their
weak Pareto superiority for infinitely repeated games, too. They are likely to guarantee
higher bargaining gains when the compliance constraint is binding because they worsen
the outside option for a given amount C. I cannot even exclude the case in which in-
kind-transfers exactly cure a compliance problem which is existent for monetary
payments. Thus, contrary to the finitely repeated games, in-kind-transfers can even
serve to safeguard the full cooperative outcome because they can imply a reduction of
the consumption of harmful commodities by decreasing the outside option's
profitability.
5. A Note on Applications
Although the economic literature has by and large neglected the stabilizing role of in-
kind-transfers, a lot of self-enforcing contracts actually exploit in-kind-transfers. This
chapter gives some insights into the application of in-kind-transfers with respect to self-
enforcing contracts. Stability problems arise most apparently for international problems
when any compliance promise must be doubted due to a principally unconstrained
sovereignty of countries. Therefore, international environmental agreements are often
not based on tied compensations. For example, a country can hardly be prevented to
continue investing in pollution-intensive industries even if it has just received financial
compensations to restrict pollution. Thus, the support concentrates on technical
assistance, financial aid for projects which have proven their environment-friendliness,
and direct investments. Generally, in-kind-transfers among sovereign nations are able to
stabilize agreements which would not come into force if they should be based solely on
monetary payments. For example, erecting a modern power plant can serve as an
efficient in-kind-transfer to stabilize a bilateral agreement about reducing transboundary
pollution.
But compliance problems are also existent in a national framework. E.g., in most
countries, at least elementary school services are provided free of charge instead of
paying the parents for sending their children to school. This organization may originate
from the danger that low-income people would prefer to spend the money for their
individual comsumption instead of school services for their children. Because poor15
people have nearly nothing to lose when they become subject of non-compliance
sanctions, free school services can enforce at least a certain degree of education.
Until now, the paper has not addressed the normative relevance of the b-function. But
enforcement problems are very often closely related to so-called merit goods. I refrain
from a critique of this concept but it should be carefully noticed that in-kind-transfers
lose any strict superiority if b and u
B coincide, i.e. when it is the purpose of agent A to
increase B's utility. Merit goods, however, drive a wedge between the assessment of B's
utility by B and an assessment of B's utility by A which can be represented by the b-
function. Thus, in-kind-transfers are often observable in cases of paternalistic relations,
especially in social policy. Therefore, coupons for clothing, food, etc. support the poor
to avoid or at least to render the retrade in alcohol, drugs, etc. more difficult.
However, the ad-hoc-assumption of merit goods is not necessary for differences in the
b- and u
B-function when externalities are absent. Strotz (1956) has demonstrated that
consistent dynamic consumption plans may fail to meet the efficient ones. He showed
that agents cannot stick to an optimal consumption plan when they discount future
utilities in a non-exponential manner. This inconsistency results in a permanent change
of plans and individual welfare losses. Because such "weak" agents are fully aware of
their inefficient behaviour, they agree to long-term contracts with specific institutions
(Bolle (1990)). At the beginning of the contract, the agents transfer resources to these
institutions which these will use to provide commodities in a way that maximizes the
long-run utility of the agent. In such a scenario, agent B is the initiator who pays agent
A at the beginning of the contract for providing certain in-kind-transfers which increase
his long-term utility. Minors who receive ice-cream and milk on a daily basis instead of
monthly income (which could be exclusively spent for ice-cream causing stomach aches
and inducing parents not to pay at all) as well as adults who join a book club to be
permanently inclined to read fit into such contracts.16
6. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has shown that in-kind-transfers are an effective instrument to stabilize
agreements when compliance cannot be guaranteed. However, in-kind-transfers were
often regarded as incurring welfare losses because the donor is hardly able to know the
receiver's preferences exactly. Welfare losses seem to arise because the receiver has to
sacrifice a significant share of the transfer for transaction costs when he reallocates his
commodity bundle to maximize his utility.
When compliance raises no special problem or when we are aiming at improving the
other agent's utility, all these arguments are well-founded. Dropping the assumption of
certainty under these conditions, in-kind-transfers are no suitable policy instrument. But
there is a rationale for in-kind-transfers if non-compliance cannot be ruled out. Then,
the transaction costs of retrading can serve as an efficient instrument to realize mutual
bargaining gains which would be left unexploited by mere monetary payments.
Asymmetric informations do not change this result essentially. On the contrary, a risk-
averse agent A who does not know B's preferences exactly will even rely more heavily
on in-kind-transfers which are known to improve the outcome. According to the
reputation-based results of Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982), an information
asymmetry is able to initiate cooperation even in finitely repeated prisoners' games for
the first periods. Because in-kind-transfers can increase the degree of realized
bargaining gains, they can support the reputation-based outcome. I hope to present a
comprehensive approach which investigates the role of in-kind-transfers in a world of
uncertainty in another paper(s).
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Appendix
The previous chapters employed a strictly separable utility function for agent B. The
appendix will outline the sufficient conditions for a general utility function of A when A
and B consume two commodities. The two commodities which B consumes also
determine the by-product. I refrain from discussing the sufficient conditions for B
because they coincide with the corresponding first two sufficient conditions for A. A's
utility is dependent on the level of consumed commodities, on the direct impact of the
by-product on A's utility and on the indirect impact via the consumption which








D , i.e. the derivative of A's marginal utility of
consumption of commodity i (i= 1,2) through agent C (C= A,B) with respect to a





















































A < ® when | Hn | denotes the determinant of the nth principal minor of
the Hessian. Besides these well-known conditions, the third minor demands
I omit the cross derivatives which means that du
A/db 5b/dXj
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The employed utility and by-product-function fulfill this condition because the
determinant of the third minor is 5u/db 3
2b/5X1
B
2 which is always positive independent
of a marginally beneficial or harmful commodity 1. But if the externalities affect A only
via a change in the marginal consumption utilities, | H31 is likely to indicate a corner
solution. Let commodity 1 represent the beneficial commodity which any voluntary








case, the absence of direct effects which shift the whole marginal utility like asset
effects in the paper do implies that Xi^i
8 '
s zero. The last two terms in the second row





















to a negative | H21. Thus, if externalities of the by-product which change the marginal






 a corner solution at least with respect to
compensations. In such a case, agent A will not engage in any transfer business. If the
scope-term still leaves the positive sign of | H21, A will concentrate on the two
commodities X1
A and X2
A; if this condition is violated, too, A will concentrate on
either one. In both cases, A refrains from any efforts to change the consumption plans
ofB.
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